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BOOK REVIEWS

OIL AND GAS, Volume
THORNTON, OIL AND GAS).

II, by Eugene Kuntz (a revision of
Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co.,

1964. Pp. 334. $25.00.
This is a commendable addition to a fine first volume.' The
author has been able to mold some diverse approaches to the
subject matter in a manner which results in a lucid and comprehensive, yet undetailed, treatment.
Volume II is devoted to a part 'of the oil and gas lease, a
subject upon which there is little uniformity as to form or interpretation. It is also a facet of the law in which the interrelationship
of all pertinent provisions must be examined in order to ascertain
their legal effect and to provide for the objectives of the parties.
Professor Kuntz approaches each problem with an overview of the
cases or topic to be discussed; with the frame of reference established, he examines the subject matter in depth. His approach
is a selective choice of authoritative decisions, rather than an
encyclopedic recitation of all cases from all jurisdictions. In the
analysis of cases the treatment is factual rather than critical.
There are some instances of prognostication but for the most part
this volume represents a statement of the law as it is, not as it
should be, nor as it may possibly be.
The law of oil and gas is unique in many ways. This accounts
for the attention given the subject by diverse authors, and provides
a warning for the uninitiated who seek to make analogies from
settled principles in other areas of the law. Professor Kuntz underscores this uniqueness and the inherent dangers of traditional
approaches to a new field of the law. For example:
The terms of the modern oil and gas lease have been drawn
from many sources to serve many very practical purposes,
and such terms were obviously not chosen for the purpose
of identifying the rights created with any single traditional
property right or concept which can be traced from feudal
land or which can be found conveniently in one of the legal
pigeonholes of property or contract law.
In states which follow the common law, difficulty is encountered in any attempt to identify the property rights
and relationship between the parties created by
the oil and
2
gas lease with any single established concept.
1. For a review of Volume I of this treatise, see Sullivan, Book Review, 39 N.D.L.
RV.255 (1963).
2. § 18.2, at 4 [of the book under review].
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Extreme care must be exercised in the use of authority from
other states or within the same state in oil and gas matters because
of the evolution and rejection of varying approaches to this new
area of the law. Historical perspective is necessary in oil and gas
law if the pitfall of citing a case no longer applicable, even though
not directly superseded, is to be avoided.
The reason for a rule may be difficult to find in some instances.
Where the circumstances can be identified they provide a frame
of reference to guide the applicability of the rule in similar situations. Professor Kuntz has analyzed the formal requirements of
oil and gas leases in the light of the nature of the instrument which
permits an evaluation of the extent of and the necessity for certain
formalities. Thus,
The requirement that the oil and gas lease be in writing
has been predicated variously upon one or more of the
propositions that it amounts to a conveyance of an interest
in land and hence within the operation of statutes relating
to conveyances, that it is within the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds for reasons not disclosed or because it amounts
to a contract either to convey an interest in land or to grant
a lease for a term of years of sufficient duration to require
a writing under local law, and that at common law the type
of interest created by an oil and gas lease could only be
created by grant which must be in writing. If the requirement of a signed writing is not fully satisfied, the lease
may still be enforceable because of part performance,
estoppel, or ratification.8
The fluidity of oil and gas law and the disparity among the
states is noted throughout. To give perspective, the author provides
a brief statement of the law generally, followed by a state by
state analysis. Even though the text does not purport to cite or
discuss every case ever decided on the subject of leases, the topics
that are considered are fully developed. There is also a good
description of remedies available for the protection of the lessee's
interest. It is difficult to apply, by way of analogy, the doctrines
that have been developed in other fields of law which are somewhat
comparable to oil and gas. Here again the reason behind a particular rule may provide sufficient flexibility in the rule itself even
though the subject matter to which the rule relates may not be
identical. The author makes an original contribution to the law
of oil and gas in the rationale which he cites for the applicability of
established remedies in other areas of the law. Thus,
If the obvious syllogistic reasoning by definition can be
avoided, and if the reasons which lie behind the traditional
statement of the rule are taken into account, ejectment
3.

§ 22.1, at 111.
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should certainly be available to an oil and gas lessee who
was on the premises engaged in a drilling or producing
as to the
operation, regardless of the theory entertained
4
technical classification of such inerest.
Professor Kuntz proposes some solutions for current problems.
For example, in the discussion of the habendum clause he suggests
that leasing problems resulting from large acreage and deeper
drilling may be resolved by providing for a relatively short primary
term but the continuation after commercial production of other
leases with the large area by the payment of increased rentals
in lieu of production. 5 There are many clauses in an oil and gas
lease which affect the so-called major clauses. Although these
clauses are important in themselves and should be examined in
depth, they are also important in terms of their principal effect,
particularly upon the duration of the lease. To illustrate the relationship and the effect of these lesser clauses on the major clauses
there is a discussion of the clauses and their correlation. No treatment in depth of the lesser clauses is attempted but is deferred to
a later time. This preserves the continuity which the author apparently desires but at the same time gives insight into important
facets that must be considered in the interpretation of a particular
major clause.6
There is one minor criticism which should be made. Midway
in the volume the author concludes that analogies from settled
principles of law may be unnecessary and unduly restrictive. For
example:
Although it impairs predictability, it is probably better for
the oil and gas lease to be treated as something unique,
with its various incidents and its full characteristics being
revealed by litigation as specific problems arise, than it is
to be controlled by an
for its incidents and characteristics
7
early arbitrary classification.
It is true that classification of interests in oil and gas has led
to some bizarre results in some states and in confusion between
cases within the same state. Nonetheless, it assists not only in
predictability but also in providing guidelines for future development
of law in an area or with respect to a subject matter that is entirely
new. The observation by the author is made about the granting
clause. There are other facets of oil and gas law where a classification will serve to reduce the chaos that currently exists, for example, royalties as rents. Perhaps the key to the author's approach
is in the words "controlled by an early arbitrary classification."
4.
6.
6.
7.

§ 25.3, at 223-224.
§ 26.3, at 251-252.
§ 26.13, at 312.
5 23.2, at 161.
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Nonetheless, he has indicated elsewhere that the reason behind the
rule is important; and the nature of the classification can likewise
be important when used carefully.
Volume II of Kuntz on Oil and Gas is good; it is concise yet
comprehensive; it states the law and the reasons for it; it is specific and yet it provides a correlation which is indispensible to
perspective in this developing field of the law.
ROBERT E.

THE SUPREME COURT AND PUBLIC PRAYER,

SULLIVAN*

By Charles E. Rice.

New York: Fordham University Press, 1964. Pp. xiii, 202. $5.00.
RELIGION

AND

THE

CONSTITUTION,

By Paul G. Kauper. Baton

Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. viii, 137. $3.50.
"The school prayer decisions, handed down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1962 and 1963, were wrongly decided." 1
So begins Professor Rice's carefully reasoned and well documented
attack on the Court's opinions in Engel v. Vitale2 and Abington
School District v. Schempp.5 Arguing that the framers intended
no denial of the people's right to recognize God, Rice believes that
the Court has committed a grievous error in outlawing prayer and
Bible reading in the public schools. The error is compounded, in
Rice's view, by his finding that God's aid has been invoked and
acknowledged in all state constitutions and by all (save two) of
our Presidents when delivering their inaugural addresses. Now, it
would appear, the Court has turned its back on the American religious
heritage.
While acknowledging the general worth of Professor Rice's work,
one may find it necessary to take issue with him on specifics. I
object to his call for good will among adherents of the several
religious traditions in this country (as issued in Chapter VIII), while
at other points in his text he refers to those who support the Court's
prayer decisions as "militant secularizers," '4 and treats their convictions as "the inflated scruples of a small minority." 5 One might
also find fault with his description of the decisions as "lawless,"6
* Dean and Professor of Law, Montana State University. A.B.,
Notre
Dame.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

RicE, at ix [of the book under review].
370 U.S. 421 (1962).
374 U.S. 203 (1963).
RIcn, p. 124.
Id. at ix.
Id. at 156.

1940, LL.B., 1946,
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as well as his suggestion that adherence to the decisions could lead
'
to a "servile abasement. 1

But we may overlook such occasional stridencies. What really
matters are the decisions themselves and the construction Professor
Rice puts upon them. They are without precedent, Rice says, they
run counter to our traditions, and they may well lead to the eventual
outlawing by the Court of chaplains in the armed services, federal
aid to parochial schools, and the revocation of tax benefits presently
conferred on religious organizations. One cannot contest or defend
opinions as yet unwritten, and thus the latter elements of Rice's
arguments may be, for the time being at least, set aside.
The principal argument, it seems to me, is Rice's contention
that the Court, in forbidding religious exercises in the public schools,
thereby shows its preference for the non-recognition of God. This
non-recognition is, in turn, seen by Rice as a preferment of another
religious position, namely, that of agnosticism. Thus, the prayer
decisions have the result of denying public sanction to one religious
strain only to give preferment to another! And, though he makes
relatively little of the point, Professor Rice considers the establishment of agnosticism as an infringement of his rights-as a member
of the majority-to the free exercise of his religion. His-and the
majority's-religion includes, apparently, the need for public recognition of a Supreme Being.
Now, one might suggest that the use of the machinery of
government for religious purposes is exactly what the turmoil and
tragedy of religious history is all about. And one could contend
that a certain open-endedness with respect to ultimate questions lies
four-square within the best traditions of a secular education whose
prime aims are the cultivation of the free pnd inquiring mind.
Certainly, a judicious restraint in the resolution of religious questions
is no more an "establishment" of anti- or non-religion than a school
teacher's studied lack of political partisanship in the classroom is
an "establishment" of a non-partisan or a political civic orientation.
But better arguments than these are available. Professor Kauper,
I believe, provides a view of the prayer decisions that prejudices
the religious liberties of neither majority nor minority. Kauper
preceives, as does Rice, the dilemma posed by the first amendment.
An example or two may serve to illustrate the point. Governmental
accommodation of my religious views, say the permission given to
withdraw my children from school on particular holidays, may to
you be an "establishment" of my religion. Likewise, public authority
which grants tax privileges to your church-without which, therefore,
7.

Ibid.
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your "free exercise" rights are seriously jeopardized-may appear
to me to be an "establishment" of your religion.
Professor Kauper is able to escape the dilemma by stressing
that "religious liberty-broadly conceived to include all varieties
of religious belief and freedom of total belief and nonbelief-is the
central value served by both clauses." 8 Rather than concerning
ourselves with whose religion is or is not being established, then,
Kauper seems to be suggesting that the validity under the first
amendment of any given governmental act has to do with the effects
upon the religious freedom of those involved. If I read Professor
Kauper correctly, preferment of this, that or the other religious
usage seems to become a secondary question.
How does the Court stand in this regard? Kauper notes three
principal theories the Court has employed: (1) the "no aid" theory
(according to which government may do nothing in support of
religion); (2) the "strict neutrality" rationale (stressing the constitutional inability to government to do anything which aids or
hinders religion); and (3) the "accommodation" theory (which
points to the necessity of government adjusting its actions to tradition
or in given situations recognizing that failure to accommodate
religion would result in a denial of free exercise). Which of these
three theories the Court is presently following is a matter of some
conjecture, but Kauper offers rather strong arguments that the
majority is more inclined to accept the accommodation theses,
despite the formal reliance in Schempp on the strict neutrality
doctrine.
On the other hand, though, Kauper is quick to indicate that the
three theories are not mutually exclusive and that, further, the
accommodation principle might well be viewed as a modification of
the other theories. He suggests that accommodation, in avoiding the
absolutism of "no aid" and "strict neutrality," may be viewed "as
the larger or benevolent neutrality." 9 Applying such principle
Kauper writes that
[W]hatever else government may or may not do, it is
required to respect religious liberty. This means, first of
all, that it must refrain from laws that restrict the free
exercise of religion or which discriminate on religious
grounds in the granting of rights and privileges, unless
clearly defined policy grounds warrant such discrimination.
It further means that since religious liberty occupies a preferred position in the constellation of constitutional freedoms
the legislature in exercising its discretionary authority may
in some situations grant a special advantage or immunity
8.
9.

IKAUpE, p. 77.
Id. at 75.
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on religious grounds in -order to facilitate the free exercise.
of religion.10
Our discussions which tend to develop from inter-religious
contest, as -well as. our conception of government as a silent observer
of the debate, may well be beside the point. The role of government,
if Kauper's views were to prevail, would be one of avoiding undue
restrictions on religious exercise, necessitating in specific circumstances certain accommodations to the needs of individual religious
viewpoints. Government is not thus confined to a "no -aid" or "strict
-neutrality" posture, difficult if not impossible to maintain. It is,
rather, committed to the defense of a religious pluralism and may,
from time to time, provide -positive. support where the maintenance
of diversity in the nation's spiritual life is threatened.
Professor Kauper concludes his discussion of what he calls "the
interrelationship of the civil and religious communities" 1 1 with an
examination of selected policy alternatives faced by both government
and the churches in coming to terms with each other and with
the issues developing in a religiously diverse society. In contrast to
Rice's somewhat alarmist views, Kauper maintains a measured
optimism and faith in the abilities and good will of both commujmties.
To be sure, there are no easy answers to questions involving
ultimate values and how these are to be searched out and defended
in an open society. Both Rice and Kauper are seriously concerned
and both contribute in their own ways to an important dialogue.
Kauper's last sentence reads:" "To bring fresh, creative, critical,
and constructive thought to bear in the establishment of... consensus
is the responsibility and the task with which we are challen~ged."
Both authors have met the challenge and both deserve to be read
and discussed.
JAMES HERNDON*

A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE is APPOINTED, By David J. Danelski.
New York: Random House, 1964. Pp. x, 242, $2.95 (paperback).

'USTICE ON TRIAL: THE CASE OF Louis D. BRANDEIS, By A. L.
Todd. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964. Pp. ix, 275, $6.50.

In A Supreme Court Justice Is Appointed and Justice on Trial,
we are presented with case-studies of the appointments of Pierce
Butler and Louis Brandeis to the Supreme Court. That Butler and
10. Id. at 77.
11. Id. at 4.
12. Id. at 12.
• Associate Professor of Political Science,

University of North Dakota.
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Brandeis were members of the Supreme Court together,' and that
several 'members of the dramatis personnae, e.g., Senator Walsh of
Montana and former President, then Chief Justice Taft, have roles
in both stories, make the books interesting to read in concert and
provide comparative insights into the appointment process. The
two men differed fundamentally in outlook, but that is not what
differentiates the two books. Both authors are concerned with describing the process by which the nominations were contested. Todd,
a free-lance writer, is primarily concerned with telling a story in
considerable detail; his approach is essentially historical. Danelski,
on the other hand, while presenting a thorough description of events,
is interested in far more: analyzing, using the political scientist's
conceptual tools, and developing a theory of explanation not only for
judicial appointments but also for other political phenomena. Because
Danelski does much more than simply tell a story, his volume is
by far the superior of the two, although Todd does add to our
knowledge of the controversy over Brandeis' nomination.
Perhaps the points at which the greatest comparison can be made
are the reactions to the two appointments and the manner in which
the battles for confirmation were fought. The campaign on Butler's
behalf in 1922 was stimulated by executive officials, including
Attorney-General Daugherty, and by Chief Justice Taft, because
Butler was not extremely well-known outside Minnesota at the time
of his nomination. 2 , Support also had to be solicited to counter
the pressure for the appointment of Martin Manton of New York,
like Butler a Catholic; in this connection, we are provided with
some insights into the participation by the Catholic hierarchy in the
endorsement of Catholic aspirants to office. Todd gives us far less
mention of the workings of those in behalf of Brandeis; we have
only a brief, tantalizing mention of Brandeis' "friendly board of
strategy," s although it is clear that the pro-Brandeis forces used
the device of providing staff assistance to the Senate committee
rather than simply making representations in their candidate's
behalf.
The campaign against Brandeis' confirmation was highly organized, with Senator Lodge soliciting and stimulating anti-Brandeis
material. Much opposition developed spontaneously in addition to
that solicited; this may be accounted for because it was directed
against a controversial figure rather than in behalf of a somewhat
less embroiled individual. Those fighting Brandeis' appointment
were well-placed in society, and included many leaders of the
American bar. When Taft and others wrote an anti-Brandeis letter,
"no such rallying of the leaders of the American bar had been seen
1.
2.
3.

Brandeis, 1916-1939; Butler, 1922-1939.
DANELSKI, pp. 56 .f [of the book under review].
ToBD, p. 114.
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in the capitol before, on any issue."' 4 These men also utilized a
lobbyist to carry on their day-to-day work, perhaps the first time
this had been done in connection with a Supreme Court appointment.
By comparison, Butler's principal opponents were several former
instructors at the University of Minnesota who felt they had been
dismissed as a result of Butler's action as a member of the University's Board of Regents. 5 The issues involving the two men were
different, also. In Brandeis' case, the allegations were of legal misconduct; in Butler's, the misconduct charged was that connected
with another role (Regent) which allegedly reflected on his "judicial
temperament."
The handling of Senatorial hearings in the two cases is enlightening. The Senators were not particularly responsive to the charges
brought against Butler (through Senator-elect Henrik Shipstead),
arguing that they could not investigate the Board of Regents of the
University of Minnesota and that Butler was only one of many
Regents. The Brandeis hearings, on the other hand, went on for
six weeks; the unhappiness of law and business leaders was neither
fully manifested nor did it have much impact on the nomination
during that time. However, the delay served the interests of Brandeis'
opponents, who created an impression that Brandeis was involved
in wrong-doing simply by the number of charges made and the sheer
6
volume of effort expended.
Both episodes provide interesting sidelights on the involvement
of the academic community in the judicial appointment process and
on academic freedom issues. These bulk larger in the Danelski
volume, but arise in the Todd study through Harvard President
Lowell's opposition to Brandeis and a counterpetition by Harvard
,students. While it appears from Danelski's description that the
Minnesota Regents did not fully understand the concepts of academic
freedom and due process, the Harvard law faculty were able to
oppose their President's stand without trepidation-Lowell even promoted Pound to Dean during the Brandeis controversy despite
7
differences of the two over the nomination.
One of the high points of the Todd volume is the sidelight cast
on Taft's desire for appointment to the Supreme Court and the
opportunities with which he was presented.8 The pressure for his
appointment to the seat vacated by Justice Lamar is really a case
study within a case study, and a good example of pressure for a
nomination ultimately not made. In this regard, it is comparable
to the pro-Manton pressure portrayed by Danelski. The pressure
4.

Id. at 160.

5.
6.

DANELSKI, pp. 94
TODD, p. 167.

7.
8.

Id. at 258 n.
Id. at 21 ff.

ff.
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for Taft's early appointment provided President Wilson with an
opportunity to consider the criteria for a "good" judge, perhaps
indirectly affecting the subsequent Brandeis appointment.
Todd's treatment of Brandeis enlarges the usual constitutional
law view of the man, although it is clear that, in contrast to Butler,
who had a more conventional law practice, Brandeis was highly
involved in large-scale public law matters and had an impact on
public law long before his nomination through, for example, his
participation in the Oregon maximum hours case 9 and the development of the "Brandeis brief." The description of Brandeis' writing
activities, his relations with the Progressives, and his role as lobbyist
and mediator also expand our view of the man. Insufficient treatment
is given, however, to his role in the New York garment workers
industry, particularly his establishment of and participation on that
industry's arbitration board. This is an important omission because
the information is relevant to the issue of Brandeis' "judicial
temperament."
We are given exposure to the question of Brandeis as a Jew,
and have in Todd's volume what amounts to a study in the meaning
of religious identification. A number of leaders of the Jewish community opposed Brandeis' appointment because they felt him a
Johnny-come-lately and thought he was using Zionism for his own
ends.10 One should note, also, Taft's comments on Brandeis not
being a good Jew. Todd explores thoroughly, without making it
an overriding feature, the specific impact of anti-Semitism in politics;
we get better perspective on the role of prejudice because it is not
the primary theme of the study.
Justice on Trial, while at times unexciting because of the amount
of detail, seems to be based on solid scholarship. One primary
weakness, in telling the story of the nomination, is that little concerning Wilson is presented which could explain his decision to nominate
Brandeis. This omission may stem from the emphasis on the fight
over the nomination; however, we are given a good picture of the
general political setting in Brandeis' time and an adequate treatment
of the ideological mood of the Court. Danelski's attention to Harding's
and Daugherty's complementary personalities as explanatory factors
in the Butler appointment" illustrates, I think, the need for more
knowledge about Wilson to complete an otherwise good description
of the Brandeis appointment.
Danelski provides us with ,a very special study by supplementing
the conventional biography and description of the nomination and
confirmation we would expect to find. In his opening biographical
materials on Butler, for example, Danelski makes use of content
9.

Muller V. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).

10.

TODD,

11.

DANELSKX, pp. 167-169.

p.

217.
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analysis of Butler's speeches to delineate the primary values in
which Butler believed.1 2 We come to these again at the end of the
volume, in an analysis aided by scaling of cases in which Butler
participated, where his previously stated values are found to be,
on the whole, highly related to his decisions on the Supreme Court. 18
Of particular interest to students of constitutional law should be
Danelski's finding that Butler was a champion of procedural due
process, despite the feelings of disgruntled former Minnesota faculty,
but that his record on substantive issues of freedom was frequently
pro-government rather than pro-individual. The competing value of
"patriotism" outweighed the value of "freedom" in these latter
cases. 14 The Progressives' expectation that Butler would side with
railroads and utilities was borne out, Butler's role in these cases"
being strengthened through the Justices' practice of turning for
16
advice to colleagues regarded as experts in a particular subject.
In summary, Todd and Danelski provide two important additions
to the literature on the Supreme Court, with quite complete
descriptions of appointment and confirmation. Danelski has gone
beyond this through the utilization or social science tools and by
elaboration of a theoretical scheme for analyzing and explaining
such phenomena. Both volumes should be read by students of
public law and the judicial process.
STEPHEN L. WASBYl

LAWYERS IN POLITICS: A STUDY IN PROFESSIONAL CONVERGENCE,

By Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague.
Co., 1964. Pp. 164, $5.00.

Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill

"Scratch a lawyer and you'll find a politician" says the old
maxim, ample testimony to the fact that many politicians are lawyers. Considerable effort has been expended in an attempt to explain
the predominance of the lawyer in politics by the authors Eulau
and Sprague. Their work is an attempt by two political scientists
to account for the disproportionate number of lawyers in state
12.
13.
14.

Id at 15 ff.
i&. at 181.
B.g., Shwlmmer v, United. gtate, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
15. See DANULSK!, p. 188 (scalogram).
16. Id. at 187.
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Moorhead State College. A.B 1959, Antioch;
M.A. 1961, Ph.D. 1962, Oregon.
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legislatures. Re-analysis of data collected in a 1957 study' of state
legislators suggested to the authors- the usefulness of the idea of
"professional convergence" as an explanation of the dominance of
the lawyer among the occupational groups in legislative chambers.
In the authors' View, a profession is a social grouping with a
corresponding set of behavior requirements which individuals who
are members or practitioners of the grouping must meet. Law is
a profession and, say the authors, politics may be considered a
profession for some individuals. Because both the profession of law
and the professional pursuit of politics (in this case the attainment
of- the -position of legislator) involve independence of action, a code
of ethics, and a norm of public service, they may be termed convergent. Thus, the similarity of the professions of law and politics
accounts for the members of the one group also being members of
the other group.
The authors review, and reject as inadequate, the traditional
eXplanations of the predominance of the lawyer in politics:- that
the Class position of lawyers and various features of the class
structure lead to the predominance of lawyers in politics,' that
the independence of the lawyer in a modern capitalist economy -leads
to their dOminance in political life, and that the monopolization of
lw enforcemerit offices by lawyers places members of the legal
pofegsion in a favorable position to occupy allied political Offices
and also leads to their predominance in state legislatures. On the
contrary, say Eulau and Sprague, professional convergence is a
more complete explanation of the fact that many legislators are
also lawyers. Law and politics are compatible activities. Moreover,
while: politics may be the temporary diversion of a lawyer, law and
legal training may be seen as one way of gaining entrance into,
or maintaining one's self in, the political world. In addition, both
occupations are characterized by moral obligation entailing public
service; both may be viewed as consisting of clientele-professional
relationships (lawyers have clients, legislators have constituents);
and both have a "code ' prescribing proper 'behavior. To the extent
that the roles of lawyer and legislator are similar in these crucial
aspects, the authors assert there exists convergence between the
professions of lawyer and politician-legislatorThis study by Eulau and Sprague Will receive careful -and critical
reading by political scientists and sociologists. Objections might
Pro&essora'Yohn C. Wahlke, William Buchanan, LeRoy C. Ferguson and Helns
Eulau extensively studied the social characteristics of the membership and the operations
of the legislatures of California, New Jersey, Ohio and Tennessee. Their findings were
published in Thu LEGIsLATIVE SYSTEM: ExPLoRATIONs IN LEoIsLATIVE BEHAVIOR (1962).
he Study by Eulau and Sprague examines the same data but with a different purpose
in mind.

2. Alexis de TocquevIlle's explanation is discussed by Eulau and Sprague on PP.
82-39; Max Weber's explanation on pp. 39Z5O; Joseph A. Schlesinger's explanation on
pp. 50-53.
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be directed to the loose use and application of the term "isomorphism, ' 8 and the cavalier interpretation of percentage differences.
The most alarming difficulty, however, is connected with the major
contribution of the authors-the explanatory power of the notion of
professional convergence. The authors have discarded the traditional
explanations of the lawyer in politics and given us a surrogate.
But how adequate is the substitute?
The appearance of the lawyer in politics results from a convergence of the role requirements of the professions of law and
politics fused through the operations of the political system. At the
same time, there is no attention given to the way in which lawyers
become legislators. Professional convergence provides no answer
but is, itself, problematic. Even if the notion of professional
convergence is later demonstrated with appropriate data to be a
valid description, it cannot by its nature alone account for the
movement of lawyers into politics. Perhaps professional convergence
along with the "partial explanations" previously discarded by the
authors will, in the aggregate, provide a more complete explanation
of the lawyer in politics than either of the explanations considered
alone.
In closing, there is nothing here that will be helpful in the
practice of law; additionally, this is a work written in the mainstream
of contemporary social science containing an abstract, and to lawyers
probably unfamiliar, analytical approach. Because of this, and the
fact that the writing bristles with technical terms, Lawyers In
Politics: A Study in Professional Convergence is likely to be difficult
and unrewarding reading for the average lawyer.
RICHARD

SUTTON*

THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL

ORDER, By Richard A. Falk. Syracuse:

LEGAL

Syracuse University Press,

1964. Pp. xvi, 184, $6.50.
It has been nearly four years since the United States and the
Soviet Union formally stated their agreement that the goal of multilateral disarmament negotiations should be in a world in which
disarmament is "general and complete," and in which disarmament
is accompanied by "reliable procedures" for the peaceful settlement
of disputes and by "effective arrangements" for the maintenance
3. Isomorphism simply defined means "of one form." The occupations of law and
politics assume the same "one form" for the authors as both professions require independence of action, and have a code of ethics and a norm of action.
* Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Dakota. B.A. 1957,
Tulane.
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of peace.1 These four years have brought some small beginnings
in limiting or slowing the pace of the arms race, as with, for
example, the Test Ban Treaty 2 and the General Assembly resolution
concerning the placing of weapons of mass destruction in outer
space, 8 but no progress has been visible toward reliable peaceful
settlement procedures or toward effective peace-keeping arrangements. The world must still shudder every time some aspiring
politician in an otherwise unimportant country seeks favor with the
electorate by arousing dormant claims against a neighboring country,
or every time angry young men in such a country turn to the Soviet
Union, Communist China or the CIA for material support against
their existing government. In this sixth decade of the twentieth
century the major nuclear powers have seemed unwilling to insulate
any dispute in any part of the world from the basic antagonisms of
the cold war. 4
. It is against this background that Professor Falk attempts to
define the role that the domestic courts of every country ought to
play in applying and developing rules of public international law.
Professor Falk rightly regards domestic courts as having a dual
role in international law cases: to act both as agents of the international order, and as institutions of the national order.5 He urges
that as agents of the international order, domestic courts "work
out formal rules that will accord respect to rival social systems
that act within their own sphere of competence. ' 6 This process
is relevant to the cold war because by "settling legal controversies
in a manner that protects the autonomy of opposed social and political
systems," domestic courts would "demonstrate that a basis for
trust really does exist. ' 7 The suggested rules are as follows:
[I]n general, municipal courts should avoid interference
in the domestic affairs of other states when the subject
matter of disputes illustrates a legitimate diversity of values
1. The Soviet-U.S. agreement on principles for disarmament negotiations was contained In a report by these states to the General Assembly. Joint Statement of Agreed
Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, U.N. Doc. No. A/4879 (1961), reprinted in
DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTS ON DISARMAMENT, 1961, at 439-42 (1962). The seventh principle reads in part as follows: "Progress In disarmament should be accompanied by
measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. . . . [T]he necessary measures [should be taken] to
maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at
the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace
force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this
force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or supress any threat
or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations." Id. at
441.
2. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433.
3, General Assembly Res. 1884 (XVIII), Oct. 17, 1963, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. flEC.,
18th Sess., Supp. No. 15, at 13 (A/5515) (1963). The resolution welcomed the expressions
by the United States and the Soviet Union "of their intention not to station in outer
space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction." Ibid.
4. See, e.g., Partan, Reducing International Tension Through the Settlement of Peripheral Conflict (1964)
(Research Memorandum, Rule of Law Research Center, Duke
University).
5. P. 72 [of the book under review].
6. P. 71.
7. P. 72.

394

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

on the part of two national societies. In contrast, if diversity

can be said to be illegitimate, as when it exhibits an abuse
of universal human rights, then domestic courts fulfill their
role by refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal
system. In instances of illegitimate diversity, where a
genuine universal sentiment exists, then the domestic courts
properly act as agents of international order only if they
give maximum effect to such universality.8
Where the diversity of values is "legitimate," the courts of the
forum state ought to defer to the policies of the foreign state in
international law cases, but where the diversity is "illegitimate,"
the courts of the forum state ought vigorously to enforce the accepted
international standard, and in either case the domestic court ought
to arrive at its result as independently of executive policy as is
possible.9 In this way law might be used as a "creative force in
the struggle to establish trust."'1
Much of Professor Falk's discussion centers on the extent to
which courts in the United States ought to respect foreign decrees
expropriating property owned by United States nationals, and on
the lower court opinions in the recent Sabbatino case." Falk considers the area of economic legislation, including the status of
foreign-owned private property, as clearly within the area of
"legitimate diversity" between competing social systems, basing
his judgment on "considerations of international stability and ethical
tolerance. '" 12 This judgment is derived from the postulate that
"the existence of capitalist and socialist national societies is an
instance of legitimate diversity" which requires that domestic courts
treat any resulting controversy "with tolerance and respect, developing principles of self-restraint and justifying interferences with
foreign economic policy by reference to variables such as extraterritoriality rather than to differences implicit in the contrasting
status of property in the two societies."' 3 In other words, in an
effort to demonstrate that international law as applied by a United
States court means something more than the political policies of
8. Ibid.
9. See pp. 86-96. Falk notes that the traditional view that "the nation should speak
with one voice in the area of foreign affairs . . . assumes that there is an univocal meaning of 'national interest' applicable In every political and legal situation [and] overlooks
the 'national Interest' that inheres in the growth of international law." P. 92.
10. P. 69.
11. Falk's book was completed prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Supreme Court held in Sabbatino that the
"Act of State" doctrine applied to preclude judicial review of the Cuban expropriations
there involved, reversing the result reached by the Court of Appeals, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir.
1962), and by the District Court, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D. N.Y. 1961). The Supreme Court
phrased its decision as holding that "the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of
a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant
and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law." 376 U.S. at 428. For discussion, see, e.g., Falk, The Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935 (1964);
and Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L.
REv. 805 (1964).
12. P. 106.
13. Pp.-72-73.
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the United States implemented in a judicial setting, and by this
process to add to the growth and stature of the international legal
system, United States courts should decline to substitute their own
view of the substantive requirements of international law for that
acted upon by the expropriating state. This practice would in effect
be an international "Act of State" doctrine, holding that the "courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government
of another done within its own territory."' 14 The result is based
more on the fact that the question arises out of the ideology or
policies of a powerful bloc of states than on doubt as to the continued
existence of the asserted substantive international law requirement
of "prompt, adequate, and effective payment"'" for expropriated
property.
This is not the place to discuss the substantive law governing
In considering whether
expropriations of foreign-owned property.'
domestic courts of capital-exporting countries ought to hear cases
involving foreign expropriations, however, it is important to note
that there is no agreement as to the customary international law
limits on the power of a state to expropriate, and that the Communist
countries reject the asserted obligation to compensate the aliens
concerned.1 Does this mean that whatever international law standard may have existed as to compensation ought not to be applied
to the Communist countries, or to any country rejecting that
standard? Professor Falk writes that
The supremacy of national law within national territory is
regarded as an established reality, except in those instances
in which there is among states a strong consensus . ., and
this consensus must include the most powerful states.
Where diversity exists, common standards are both ineffective and inappropriate, at least so long as the enunciation,
the application, and the enforcement of international standards cannot be entrusted reliably to central institutions . . .18
Where there is no consensus, or where the consensus has evaporated,
the prevailing diversity should be respected by national courts as
their contribution to the growth of trust between conflicting social
systems. The national court need not accept the view of substantive
international law implicit in the act of the foreign state, but in
14. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). The Court went on to say that
"Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves." Ibid. See also the Sabbatino formulation, supra note 11. Sabbatino held that the "Act of State" doctrine is not
required by International law. 376 U.S. at 421.
15. The quoted language is from a 1938 Note from Secretary Hull to the Mexican
Ambassador,

3 HACKWORTH,

DIGEST

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 658-59

(1942).

16. Sabbatino involved claims that the Cuban expropriation decree violated international law on three grounds: that it was an act of retaliation against the United States
government, and hence not a taking for a public purpose; that it discriminated against
United States nationals; that it failed to provide adequate compensation. See Supra note 11.
17. See, e.g., the authorities cited by the Supreme Court in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
428-29, n. 26-31.
18. Pp. 170-71.
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fulfillment of its role as an agent of the international order, the
national court should respect the competence of the foreign state
to undertake the act in question. 19
A major difficulty -in applying Professor Falk's thesis would be
presented by an effort to determine whether the "diversity" involved
in a particular case is "legitimate" or "illegitimate."
If, as
indicated, legitimacy results from differences in outlook of contesting
social systems, and from the power positions of the dissenting states,
when would it ever be appropriate for a United States court to view
a particular diversity as illegitimate? Falk broadly distinguishes
between human rights standards and economic policies, suggesting
that legitimate diversity embraces the latter, but not the former.
This distinction may adequately settle the scope of review of the
rare human rights question that reaches a foreign court, but it gives
little guidance in the more usual case involving diversity in the
treatment of foreign-owned property. For example, Falk suggests
that the Cuban decree involved in the Sabbatino case falls outside
of the domain of legitimate diversity since it expropriated only the
property of United States nationals, and since there is "respectable
international authority" to support a conclusion that discriminatory
takings violate international law. 20 Respectable authority would not
be enough, however, if it is both "ineffective and inappropriate" for
a national court to apply common standards where powerful states
21
dissent.
The Sabbatino case indicates primary concern with a differing
element in the problem of national court application of international
law standards in today's world. The Supreme Court, as has been
noted, applied the "Act of State" doctrine to decline to review the
compatibility of the Cuban expropriation with international law
standards. 2 2 In so holding, the Court emphasized both the existing
disagreement between capitalist and Communist states as to the
applicable international law standards, and the delicate and important implications of any potential court decision for the foreign
relations of the United States.' 3 The Court reiterated the Baker v.
Carr dictum that not every case that touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance,'24 and held that the "Act of State"
19.
A supranational court would of course be, competent to review the substantive law
aspects of the expropriation, but in Falk's view even the supranational forum should

"avoid an obsolescent application of international standards that expresses an older, but
now nonexistent, consensus." P. 74.
20.
Pp. 110-11.
21.
Falk considers that "where uniformity exists to support political majorities in
international institutions," apparently including the most powerful states, common standards may be applied even if "such standards override the fundamental policies of the
national governments," apparently meaning those that do not subscribe to the supposed
consensus. Where diversity exists, writes Falk, "the role of international law is confined
to the tasks of making rules of deference explicit and uniform and of formulating mutually acceptable ways to delimit the domain of national competence." P. 171.
22.
See supra notes 11, 16.

23.
24.

376 U.S. at 427-37.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ; quoted, 376 U.S. at 423.
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doctrine is not required by international law, 25 but found that the
doctrine does have "constitutional underpinnings" arising out of
"the basic relationships between branches of government in a system
of separation of powers. ' 26 The Court was careful not to indicate
that its decisions in this area must always follow executive policy,
but exhibited concern that the involvement of the judiciary in passing
on the validity of foreign acts of state might "hinder rather than
further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the
community of nations as a whole ... ,,27 and pointed out that in
several ways the Executive is better qualified than the courts to
deal with asserted breaches of international law by foreign states.
The Court noted that judicial determinations can reach only such
property as fortuitously comes into the United States, whereas the
Executive speaks for all claimants in diplomatic negotiations with
the expropriating state. 28 More significantly from the point of view
of the development of international law, the Court emphasized that
When articulating principles of international law in its
relations with other states, the Executive Branch speaks
not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but also as an advocate of
standards it believes desirable for the
29 community of nations
and protective of national concerns.
Rather than endeavoring to characterize differences in outlook as
legitimate or illegitimate, the Supreme Court's concern is with the
impact of its activity on the Executive and on the Executive's
foreign affairs responsibilities. The Court notes that it is a "sensitive
task" to establish principles "not inconsistent with the national
interest or with international justice" where diversity exists, and
that, even apart from diversity as to the applicable substantive law,
the importance of the issue for foreign relations must be weighed
in deciding whether it should be decided by United States courts. 0
Although the rhetoric of the Sabbatino case includes references
to the needs of the community of nations, the controlling consideration
seems to be the division of functions between the Executive and the
Judiciary within the national government, and not the role of the
courts as agents of the international community. If Sabbatino erred
toward this form of provincialism, however, it at least avoided the
pretense of impartial decision of politicially important international
law questions. That even this measure of independence is not
desired by powerful elements in the national society is shown by the
25. 376 U.S. at 421. On the constitutional law basis of the "Act of State" doctrine, see
Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REv.
805 (1964).
26.
376 U.S. at 423.
27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 431-32.
29. Id. at 432-83.
30. Id. at 428.
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ensuing Act of Congress31 directing the courts to abandon the "Act
of State" doctrine in expropriation cases.
So long as states continue in their hesitancy to submit to the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, domestic courts
must bear the major judicial burden of developing and applying
international law. There is no end to defining exactly what that
role ought to be in the varient situations in which the question arises,
but Professor Falk has made a major contribution to clarity in
thought, and especially to an understanding of the limits on the
effectiveness of national adjudication in the development of world
order.
DANIEL

G.

PARTAN*

31. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 78 Stat. 1013. The Executive supported adherence
to the "Act of State" doctrine in Sabbatino, and opposed the Act of Congress, which expires on January 1, 1966. It should be noted that the application of the "Act of State"
doctrine in Sabbatino does not result in a transfer of the assets involved to Cuba. The
United States has issued Treasury Regulations freezing Cuban assets in this country and
blocking transfers of property interests to Cuba or to Cuban nationals. See Cuban Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515.101-.808 (1964). In essence, therefore, the Sabbatino
litigation may be viewed as an effort to resolve a conflict in interest between the individual
claimants to the particular assets before the court and the entire class of United States
nationals from whom Cuba has taken property, and who might therefore share in the ultimate disposition to be made of all Cuban assets controlled by the United States government.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. A.B., 1955, Cornell; LL.B.,
1958, LL.M., 1961, Harvard. Member of the Massachusetts Bar.

